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This paper studies the choice of the monetary regime in a small open economy with the
special focus on the EMU accession countries. In the framework of a two - country DSGE model
we conduct policy experiments consisting in analysing the e⁄ects of di⁄erent monetary regimes
(roughly representing the current choices of the accesion countries) on the dynamics and volatility
of an accession economy. We study carefully the real exchange rate determination in the long
run and the short run as it summarises the pattern of the stabilisation of an accession economy
in response to the shocks. Our benchmark analysis indicates that the managed ￿ oat regime can
attain the lowest consumption gap and at the same time guarantee the moderate changes in the
nominal interest rate, nominal exchange rate and in￿ ation. However parameters summarising its
sensitivity to nominal exchange rate movements and in￿ ation pressures depend on the underlying
shocks. Additionally the sensitivity analysis indicates that the choice of the monetary regime may
be dependent also on the speci￿c structure of a small open economy. In particular a small share
of nontradables, a high degree of openness and the high pass through may be advocates for the
managed regimes frequently observed in the accession countries.
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11 Introduction
The common objective of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and also South Eastern
European (SEE) countries is the accession to the European Union (EU) and subsequently to the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU).1 Each of these countries has a di⁄erent macroeconomic experience and
faces a di⁄erent stage of the stabilization process aimed at convergence towards the euro area. Despite
the di⁄erences these economies share common characteristics such as a rapid productivity growth, in-
frastructure improvements and vulnerability to external disturbances. Additionally their monetary
policies are obliged to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria which stand for the prerequisites to
enter the EMU.2
These restrictions raise a question on the choice of the monetary regime in the accession countries
which would facilitate their fast compliance. Some academics in the qualitative debates (e.g. Buiter
and Grafe (2003) or Coricelli (2002)) call for adopting the peg regime in these countries as it enhances
the credibility of the monetary policies3 and also strengthens links with the EU and EMU. However
in reality we still observe a heterogeneity in the choice of the regime among the accession countries.
Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania and also Latvia4 chose to peg to the euro. Interestingly majority of
the accession countries, i.e. Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia5
decided for the managed ￿ oating regime while Poland went for the ￿ exible regime with CPI strict
targeting.6
The goal of this paper is to study the implications of the di⁄erent monetary regimes on the
volatility of an accession economy - especially volatility of the variables summarizing the Maastricht
criteria, i.e.: in￿ ation rate, nominal interest rate and also nominal exchange rate. Moreover taking
into account the structural di⁄erences between the accession countries we analyse whether and how
structural parameters matter for the performance of the studied monetary regimes.
We build a two - country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which aims to illustrate the
1On the 1st of May 2004 10 Central and Eastern European countries, i.e. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, entered the European Union. At the moment
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia (from 27th of June 2004), Latvia, Cyprus, Malta (from 2nd of May 2005) and Slovakia
(26th of November 2005) participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II which constitutes for a preparatory step to
enter the European Monetary Union. As far as the group of the South Eastern European countries is concerned, i.e.
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, the ￿rst two are expected to join the European Union in 2007. The latter waits still
for the opening of the negotiation process with the EU.
2These criteria constitute in: achieving the level of domestic in￿ation that does not exceed by more than 1.5% the
average level of domestic in￿ation in the three lowest in￿ation countries of the euro area and also the long - term nominal
interest that does not exceed by more than 2% above the average in the three lowest in￿ation countries of the euro area.
What is more the countries are required to attain nominal exchange rate stability by limiting their nominal exchange
rate movements around central parity against the euro within the band of ￿15%.
3The credibility aspects of the monetary regime choice in the CEE and SEE countries are adressed in the paper of
Ravenna (2005).
4Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania opted for currency board with the euro as an anchor. Latvia pegged towards SDR
(Special Drawing Rights) until January of 2005 when it switched for euro.
5Hungary follows the peg regime towards euro with the band of 15% around the central parity. The Czech Republic
and Slovakia stress also the in￿ation targeting as the reference for the monetary policy.
6The o¢ cial classi￿cation of the exchange rate regimes in the accession countries together with the Reinhart Rogo⁄
classi￿cation and Yeyati classi￿cation can be found in Goldberg (2005).
2structure of each of these economies and also its disturbances· environment. Importantly the chosen
modelling strategy enables us to perform policy experiments consisting in changing the monetary
regimes and analyzing its implications on the economies. The model describes a small open economy
exposed to its internal disturbances (both demand and supply shocks) and also external ones coming
from the large economy such as the euro area. Since the adjustment process to any of the shocks
in a small open economy depends greatly on the real exchange rate dynamics we study in detail the
main determinants of this variable in the long and short run. In our framework real exchange rate is a
summary of the current and future decisions on the interest rate. The study of the determinants of the
real exchange rate in the short run provides us with the meaningful platform for the monetary regimes
comparison, i.e. the real interest rate developments. We also identify the key structural parameters,
i.e. degree of openness, structure of the goods, elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods, degree of exchange rate pass - through and price stickiness which a⁄ect the way a small open
economy responds to the shocks. Finally we study whether performance of the alternative regimes
can be altered by changing values of the structural parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts on the CEE and SEE
countries based on the empirical literature. Section 3 describes the model and contrasts it with
the existing theoretical literature. Section 4 and 5 focus on the determinants of the macroeconomic
volatility in the long run and in the short run respectively. Section 6 presents a comparison of the
monetary regimes under the chosen calibration. Section 7 reports the sensitivity analysis results on
the structural parameters and their impact on the monetary regime performance. Section 8 concludes
indicating possible further research directions.
2 Stylized facts on the CEE and SEE economies
Our aim is to detect important characteristics of the CEE and SEE countries which a⁄ect the
choice of the monetary regime in these countries. Importantly we study the determinants of macro-
economic volatility in these countries. Moreover we have a close look at some structural parameters
which can be indicative for the choice of the monetary regime. Finally we analyze brie￿ y economic
performance of the CEE and SEE on the basis of their monetary regime choice.
All the CEE and SEE countries can be treated as small open economies. Their real GDP do
not exceed 1% of the nominal GDP of the euro area (except for Poland for which the ratio amounts
to 3%). The ratio of imports in their nominal GDP ranges from 37% (for Poland) up to 83% (for
Estonia). Moreover the euro area countries are the biggest trading partner of these countries with the
share on average of 50% in their total trade.7
As far as the stochastic environment of the CEE and SEE countries is concerned, Sueppel (2003)
￿nds that these countries are characterized by higher growth and wider output ￿ uctuations than the
7A detailed data on the structural characteristics of the accession countries as compared to the EU-15 can be found
in the appendix.
3euro area and other EU countries.8 Moreover he identi￿es that the degree of synchronization of their
business cycles with the euro area is smaller and heterogenous than of the United Kingdom, Sweden
and Denmark. This a consequence of the stabilization process taking place in these countries and
re￿ ected in the structural reforms, infrastructure improvements and a high productivity growth.
Having in mind the restrictions set on the monetary policy in the accession countries we ￿nd
important to identify the main determinants of the real exchange rate dynamics which summarize the
pressures on in￿ ation, nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate.
Since all the CEE and SEE countries are characterized by a high productivity growth (especially
in the tradable sector) many researchers test the hypothesis of the Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect for these
countries. According to the Balassa -Samuelson e⁄ect (Balassa (1964)) a country which experiences
a higher productivity growth in the traded sector will face higher consumer prices and subsequently
real exchange rate appreciation. Assuming that the price of tradables is ￿xed internationally, a higher
productivity growth in the traded sector will necessarily lead to an increase in the country wide wage
and subsequently an increase in nontradable prices (due to higher labour costs). This mechanism will
lead to a real exchange rate appreciation. Under the ￿xed exchange rate regime Balassa - Samuelson
e⁄ect will result in higher CPI in￿ ation and real exchange rate appreciation. Under the ￿ oating
regime we can observe a combination of an increased CPI in￿ ation in transition countries together
with nominal exchange rate appreciation. This issue comes to be especially relevant in light of the
future membership of the CEE and SEE countries in the EMU and their necessity to comply with
the Maastricht criteria. An existence of the strong Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect could endanger the
attempts of keeping low in￿ ation di⁄erential between these countries and the euro area.
We can list the following empirical studies analyzing the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect in the CEE
and SEE countries: Cipriani (2001), de Broeck and Slok (2001), Egert et al. (2002), Fisher (2002),
Halpern and Wyplosz (2001), Coricelli and Jazbec (2001), Arratibel et al. (2002) and Mihaljek and
Klau (2004). The main ￿ndings of these papers are rather diverse. The estimates indicate that the
Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect can explain from 0 - 3.5% per annum of the existing di⁄erence between
in￿ ation rates in the transition countries and the euro area.9 These di⁄erent results come from the
varied methodologies used10 and also diverse treatment of the data: especially the share of nontradable
goods in the economies and inclusion of the regulated prices in it11. Moreover many studies neglected
also a signi￿cant rise in productivity of nontradables and existence of the nontradable component in
tradable goods.
The original formulation of the Balassa - Samuelson theory totally neglects the role of the demand
8See graphs 1 and 2 in the section of data on the accession countries of the Appendix.
9See Mihaljek and Klau (2004) for the comparative analysis of the empirical studies on the Balassa - Samuelson
e⁄ect in the CEE and SEE countries (Table 1).
10The methodologies used in the empirical studies range from simple OLS exercises to more advanced techniques such
as: VAR and panel cointegration analyses.
11According to Mihaljek, Klau (2004) the common mistake in number of studies was to include in the nontradables
the regulated prices (such as energy, transport). These kinds of goods can account up to 25% of GDP and since they
are not governed by market - based pricing we cannot observe the Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect on them.
4side of an economy in a⁄ecting the real exchange rate dynamics. This is due to very restrictive
assumptions such as the law of one price for tradables, perfect mobility of production factors and
perfect competition. Some authors such as de Gregorio et el. (1994), de Broeck and Slok (2001),
Cova (2004) and Astrov (2005) and Dufrenot et al. (2003) point out that in reality also demand side
shocks can lead to real exchange rate appreciation and in￿ ationary pressures. According to de Broeck
and Slok (2001) observed growth of incomes in the CEE and SEE countries can increase the demand
for nontradable goods and subsequently their price. Additionally since government expenditures
fall predominantly on the nontraded goods they lead to a rise of price of nontradables. Moreover
de Gregorio and Wolf (1994), Cova (2004) and Astrov (2005)12 argue that demand shocks in the
accession countries can lead to terms of trade improvements and through the income e⁄ect to real
exchange rate appreciation and in￿ ation. Astrov (2005) ￿nds that real exchange rate in the CEE
and SEE countries is a⁄ected positively by terms of trade (depreciation e⁄ect) and negatively by the
share of government expenditures (appreciation e⁄ect) in the gross domestic product.13 Additionally
Dufrenot et al. (2003)14 report that public ￿nances and current account in￿ uence the real exchange
rate dynamics. Their substantial deterioration is re￿ ected in the real exchange rate depreciation.
The described demand side and supply side shocks constitute qualitatively for the common factors
shaping the macroeconomic volatility in the CEE and SEE countries. Still there exist initial conditions,
i.e. in￿ ationary environment and structural parameters such as degree of openness and degree of
exchange rate pass-through which make the countries to choose di⁄erent monetary regimes.
Interestingly as far as the initial conditions are concerned Klyuev (2001) in his model of exchange
rate regime choice in the CEE and SEE countries15 ￿nds the nonlinear relationship between the rate of
in￿ ation and the degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility. The panel study indicates that a rise in in￿ ation
from a low level suggests introduction of more ￿ exible exchange rate regimes while an increase in
already high in￿ ation is a sign to implement a rather ￿xed regime. The ￿xed regime present in the
environment of considerable rigidities in both labour and goods market may lead to a decrease in the
competitiveness of a country. That is why several Central and Eastern European countries (i.e. the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) have decided recently to introduce more ￿ exible exchange rate
arrangements.
Moreover the traditional Optimum Currency Area theory indicates that countries that are more
open and therefore more vulnerable to nominal exchange rate movements should opt for the ￿xed
12The authors argue that these demand shocks are re￿ected in an increased demand for the tradables due to quality
improvements (consistent with a changing composition of the tradables in the CEE and SEE countries). In that way
the Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect can be replicated as long as the productivity increase consists in a quality improvement
and a rise in the price of tradables.
13It is a panel regression study. The countries included in the sample are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. The sample period for the study is 1990-2001. In this study one can also ￿nd
the summary of some of the previous results.
14The authors of this study use the structural VAR and Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate methodology. The
study is is developed for 5 countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
15His study includes 13 Central and Eastern European economies: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, LIthuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
5regime. This can be somewhat explanatory for the case of Estonia which chose to peg and on the
other pole for Poland which opted for the ￿ exible regime.16
The degree of exchange rate pass through in an economy, i.e. the degree to which extent nominal
exchange rate ￿ uctuations feed into the domestic prices and a⁄ect the rate of in￿ ation in the economy
is especially crucial for small, open economies. According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and also
empirical studies by Chaudry and Hakura (2002) and Devereux and Yetman (2003) exchange rate
shocks in the emerging economies tend to feed into aggregate in￿ ation at a much faster pace than
in the industrialized economies. This fact in￿ uences the choice of monetary policy which should be
used to adjust to external shocks. Moreover it raises the question of how important the exchange rate
adjustment should be in the chosen monetary rule.
As far as the accession countries are concerned the majority of their imports is invoiced in euro.
According to ECB reports on the international role of the euro (2002, 2004, 2005) and Goldberg (2005)
in 2002 on average 58,5% of the accession countries imports were invoiced in euro.17 Importantly
the large pass through together with observed rigidities in the labour and goods market endanger
the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy and suggest implementation of strict exchange rate targeting.
Additionally Coricelli and Jazbec (2004) in their study on the four CEE countries ￿nd that managed
￿ oat policies aimed at accommodating the adverse shocks on the real exchange rate can actually
induce the strong exchange rate pass-through. That is why Slovenia and Hungary (opting for more
￿xed regimes) are reported to experience perfect pass-through while in case of the Czech Republic
and Poland (opting for more ￿ exible regimes) this degree is much smaller.
Summing up the CEE and SEE economies experience common driving forces a⁄ecting their macro-
economic volatility. Still they di⁄er in some structural parameters and ultimate choices of the mon-
etary regimes. The natural question which arises now how the choice of the monetary regime can
in￿ uence the macroeconomic volatility of a country. A quick look at the summary of economic indica-
tors presented in the section: data on the accession countries of the Appendix indicates that countries
following an intermediate monetary regime perform the worst in terms of in￿ ation stabilization. On
the other hand the only country following the free ￿ oating strategy experiences the highest volatility
in nominal exchange rate. Countries following peg regime are characterized by strong GDP growth
and stable in￿ ation.
3 The Model
We build a small scale model of an accession economy18 with the aim to study how di⁄erent monetary
regimes perform in stabilizing such an economy in the stochastic environment. We present an accession
16See the tables on the share of imports and exports in GDP and also share of nontradables in the total consumption
for the accession countries compared with EU-15, presented in the section: data on the accession countries in the
Appendix.
17In the EU-15 countries it was respectively 49,5%. (see Goldberg (2005)).
18By this term we mean any CEE and SEE economy.
6economy as a small open economy interacting with the rest of the world economy - chosen to be the
euro area. The model represents two economies of unequal size: a small open home economy and a
foreign large and closed economy. In each country consumers can choose between nontraded goods,
home traded goods and foreign traded goods. We introduce home bias meaning that consumers prefer
to buy domestic traded goods rather than foreign imported goods.19 Labour markets are perfectly
competitive where labour is mobile between sectors in each country and immobile between countries.
Goods markets are assumed to be monopolistically competitive. The price rigidities occur in all the
sectors and moreover producers of traded goods are allowed to price discriminate across countries.
Purchasing power parity does not hold for two reasons: existence of the nontraded goods and market
power in the tradable goods sector. Importantly market power in the tradable good sector opens
the role for terms of trade in stabilisation of the economy.20 Moreover price discrimination in the
tradable goods sector results in the imperfect exchange rate pass - through of nominal exchange rate
into prices. Finally assets markets are complete in both countries.
Our model is constructed in the spirit of open - economy models introduced by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2000), who incorporated in stochastic models a non-traded good sector with sticky prices. Although
our focus is on the small open economy our model composes of two countries and therefore it is close in
its structure to the model of Benigno and Thoenisen (2003). The authors examine the real exchange
rate ￿ uctuations between United Kingdom and the euro area and analyze whether supply shocks in
the traded good sector could explain the real exchange rate appreciation of the British pound in
the nineties. Our setting is also similar to the model of a currency area presented in the paper of
Altissimo et al. (2004). The authors focus their analysis on the determinants of in￿ ation di⁄erentials
in a currency area.
As far as the literature on monetary policy in the accession economies is concerned our model is
closely related to Devereux (2003), Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003).
The models of Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) describe small open economies
without a detailed structure of the rest of the world economy. Devereux (2003)21 relaxes a number
of assumptions present in our model: he allows for rigidities in labour market, incomplete asset
structure and introduces two production factors: mobile labour and immobile capital. However the
traded good sector is more restrictively set: it is assumed to be perfectly competitive with prices
￿xed internationally. Consumers can choose only between nontraded goods and import goods (with
internationally ￿xed prices). The model of Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) di⁄ers from Devereux
(2003) in a number of assumptions: importantly export goods can be consumed also internally and
there is a limited substitutability between foreign and home traded goods, labour market is perfectly
19This feature is common for the Central and Eastern European countries. The share of foreign imported consumption
goods is very low amounting to 32% of the tradable consumption (see the section: data on the accession countries of
the Appendix).
20According to Goldberg (2005) in 2003 di⁄erentiated products accounted for 62-83% of the accession country exports.
Organized exchange traded goods (often priced in dollars) amounted to less than 8% of the total exports in these
countries. Finally reference priced goods are between 15 to 30% of the accession country exports.
21The model used in this paper is based on Devereux, Lane (2003).
7competitive. In both papers there is put a special attention on productivity shocks in the domestic
traded good sector which lead to a real exchange rate appreciation and higher in￿ ation (the Balassa
- Samuelson e⁄ect). Subsequently the authors study how di⁄erent monetary regimes perform in
absorbing these shocks. Devereux (2003) ￿nds out that ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting with some weight
on exchange rate stability proves to be the best policy responding to two (speci￿c to these countries)
types of shocks: changing country risk - premia and productivity rises in domestic export sector.22
This policy prevents from excessive in￿ ation present under ￿xed regime and recession with reduction in
employment appearing under CPI in￿ ation targeting. Similarly according to Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003) under a ￿xed or managed exchange rate regime productivity increases in tradable sector can
lead to excessive in￿ ation.
In addition the model of Laxton and Pesenti (2003) presents in a very rich structure a small
accession economy and its interdependence relation with the big economy, the euro area. The authors
focus their study on how di⁄erent interest rate rules perform in stabilising variability of in￿ ation
and output of the small economy. Other papers which develop small open economy models with two
sectors are Soto (2003) and Devereux, Lane and Xu (2004). The latter examines the importance of
the exchange rate pass through in the choice of monetary regime when the economy is hit by terms
of trade shocks and world interest rate shocks. Soto (2003) studies the implications of the existence
of the rigidities in both traded and nontraded sector for the monetary policy choice in the small open
economy.
As far as the structure of our model is concerned we include some realistic assumptions not present
jointly in the previous papers on the accession economies, namely: a nonhomogeneous tradable sector,
market power in both domestic sectors, home bias and imperfect pass through. Moreover on the
contrary to the above listed papers in which only chosen shocks are discussed, we examine how the
variability of the economy is a⁄ected by the set of the following internal and external (demand and
supply side) shocks:
￿ supply: productivity shocks in traded and nontraded good sector both in the domestic economy
and abroad,
￿ demand: government expenditure shocks in nontraded and trade good sector both in the do-
mestic economy and abroad, changes in the distortionary taxes both in the domestic economy
and abroad.
This analysis enables us to answer the question on the relative importance of each of the shocks
in destabilizing the economy. Importantly we perform a policy experiment consisting in analyzing
the e⁄ects of the chosen monetary regime on the way the accession economy responds to the shocks.
In particular we study the implications of the four monetary regimes which can re￿ ect roughly the
choices in the CEE and SEE countries, i.e.:
22However the author stresses that if one wants to incorporate into the discussion the role of liability dollarization
and balance sheet e⁄ects then the ￿xed regime seems to be more appropriate.
8￿ a ￿xed exchange rate regime (a strict peg to the currency of the big country, suitable for the
description of e.g. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania),
￿ a ￿ exible exchange rate regime in which the monetary rule stabilises CPI in￿ ation (e.g. Poland),
￿ a managed ￿ oat exchange rate regime in which the monetary rule stabilises CPI in￿ ation and
nominal exchange rate (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia).
Moreover we analyze the role of the chosen structural parameters of the economy such as degree of
openness, degree of elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, share of nontradables
and degree of exchange rate pass - through in a⁄ecting volatility of the domestic economy under each
of the studied regimes.
3.1 Households
The world economy consists of a measure one of agents: [0;n) belonging to the small country (home)
and [n;1] belonging to the rest of the world - the euro area (foreign). There are two types of di⁄erenti-
ated goods produced in each country: traded and non-traded goods. Home traded goods are indexed
on the interval [0;n) and foreign traded goods on the interval [n;1] respectively. The same applies to
the non-traded goods. Households are assumed to be in￿nitely lived and they behave according to
the permanent income hypothesis. Moreover in each country they can choose between three types of
goods: non-traded, domestic traded and foreign traded goods. Foreign households are indexed with
i￿: Ci
s represents consumption at period s of a consumer i and Li
s stands for his labour supply. Each



















where Et denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at date t, ￿ is the intertemporal
discount factor and 0 < ￿ < 1; U(￿) stand for ￿ ows of utility from consumption and V (￿) represents
￿ ows of disutility from supplying labour.24 C is a composite consumption index. We de￿ne consumers￿
preferences over the composite consumption index Ct of tradable goods (CT;t) (domestically - produced













































1+￿ with ￿ (￿ > 0) - the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
and ￿ (￿ ￿ 0) - the inverse of the labour supply elasticity.
24In general we assume that U is twice di⁄erentiable, increasing and concave in Ct and V is twice di⁄erentiable,
increasing and convex in Lt.
9where ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods and ￿ 2 [0;1]
is the share of the nontradable goods in the overall consumption. The tradable good consumption is


















where ￿ > 0 is elasticity of substitution between home traded and foreign traded goods, ￿ - home
bias being the function of the relative size of the small economy with respect to the euro area and
its degree of openness ￿ such that (1 ￿ ￿) = (1 ￿ n)￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1].25 Let us notice that degree of
openness is related to degree of home bias, i.e. the higher degree of openness the smaller degree of
home bias.



































where ￿￿ = n￿:
Finally Cj and Cj￿(where j = H;H￿;N and j￿ = F;F￿;N￿) are consumption sub-indices of the





































where ￿j > 1; ￿j
￿
> 1 are elasticities of substitution between domestic goods in each country.26
The consumption - based price indices expressed in the units of currency of the respective country





















25This speci￿cation is based on de Paoli (2004). Moreover we exclude the situation where ￿ = 0 for which the economy
is closed.































































Both the existence of the nontradable goods and assumed home bias cause the deviations from
purchasing power parity. So P 6= SP￿: The real exchange rate can be de￿ned in the following manner:
RS = SP
￿
P : Moreover we de￿ne the terms of trade as T = PF
PH and the ratio of nontradable to tradable
goods￿prices as Td = PN
PT :
From consumers￿preferences we can derive total demand of the generic goods - n (home nontrad-
























































































F are the government expenditure shocks occurring both in nontraded and
traded good sectors in each economy.
Households get disutility from supplying labour to all the ￿rms present in each country. Each










We assume that consumers have the access to a complete set of securities - contingent claims
traded internationally. Each household faces the following budget constraint:
PT;sCi
T;s + PN;sCi



















where at date s: Ds+1 - nominal payo⁄ of the portfolio held at the end of period (s), Qs;s+1 - the
stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo⁄s relevant to the domestic household,
￿H;s and ￿N;s - nominal pro￿ts from the domestic ￿rms and TRi
s - nominal lump sum transfers from
the domestic government to the household i. The similar budget constraint can be written for the
euro area. Moreover in both countries consumers face no Ponzi game restriction.
The short term interest rate is de￿ned as the price of the portfolio which delivers one unit of




Both economies are cashless - limiting monetary ones (as in Woodford (2003)).
The maximization problem of any household consists in maximizing (1) to (20) in order to deter-
mine the optimal path of the consumption index, labour index and contingent claims at all times.
The solution to the household decision problem gives a set of ￿rst order conditions. Optimization
























There is a perfect sharing in this setting meaning that marginal rates of consumption in nominal
























where ￿ > 0 and depends on the initial wealth distribution. We have to point out here that although
the assumption of complete markets conveniently simpli￿es the model it neglects a possibility of wealth
e⁄ects as a result of the di⁄erent shocks.










where Wk(i) - nominal wage of the consumer i in the sector k (k = H;N): So the real wage is
equal to marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption.
3.2 Firms
All the ￿rms are owned by the consumers. Both tradable and nontratadable sectors are monopolis-
tically competitive. As far as the traded goods are concerned (both domestic and foreign ones) we
assume price discrimination between domestic market and a foreign one.
Since ￿rms use only labour as their output the production function for ￿rm i in k (k = H;F;N)












We take the domestic economy as the representative one in which ￿rms in nontraded and traded
sector optimize prices.
3.2.1 Nontraded sector
Price is set according to Calvo pricing scheme. Each period a fraction of ￿rms (1￿￿N) decides their










where e PN;t(i) is the price chosen as a result of the maximization problem. Loglinearization of (29)





13where ^ qN;t = ln
e PN;t(i)























N;t:t+s(i) - demand for the individual nontraded good produced by producer i at time
(t + s) conditional on keeping the price PN;t(i) ￿xed at the level chosen at time t; MCN
t - nominal
marginal cost in the nontraded sector a time t, ￿t - revenue taxes at time t.














































Let us notice that in the ￿ exible price setting the optimal price in the nontraded sector is set at












In the sticky price environment we obtain the nontraded in￿ ation equation (as a result of the
loglinearisation of (33) around the steady state de￿ned in the appendix):
b ￿N;t = kN(￿ b AN
t + b !t + wb ￿t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b Td
t ) + ￿Etb ￿N;t+1 (35)
where w = ￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿ ; kN =
(1￿￿N￿)(1￿￿N)
￿N (￿ is a steady state ratio of taxes in the aggregate output).
The equation (35) represents the new - Keynesian Phillips curve for the domestic nontraded sector.
According to this equation the nontraded in￿ ation is driven by changes in the real marginal cost which
are represented by: (￿ b AN
t + b !t +wb ￿t ￿(1￿￿)b Td
t ). Therefore we study the main determinants of the
real marginal in this sector: Nontradable productivity shocks lead to a decline in the real marginal
cost. Tax shocks and real wage increases result in the higher real marginal cost. Additionally a rise
in the relative price of domestic nontradable goods to tradable goods generates a substitution e⁄ect
away from the nontradable to tradable goods and decreases the real marginal cost. The magnitude of
this e⁄ect depends inversely on the share of nontradables in the domestic consumption basket.
143.2.2 Traded sector
Traded goods￿￿rms supply goods both to the home market and export to the rest of the world. Their
pricing decision is based on the local currency pricing. Price is set according to Calvo pricing scheme.
Each period a fraction of ￿rms (1￿￿H) decides the price maximising their expected pro￿ts subject to
the demand schedule in a given market: foreign market and a domestic one (we can separate pricing
















































When prices are ￿ exible the optimal prices in the traded sector, i.e. the internal price e PH;t and
export price e P￿































In the sticky price environment we obtain two sector in￿ ation equations, i.e. home traded in￿ ation
b ￿H;t and export traded in￿ ation b ￿
￿
H;t (after loglinearization around the steady state):
b ￿H;t = kH(￿ b AH
t + b !t + wb ￿t + ￿b Td





t + b !t ￿ c RSt + wb ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)b T￿
t + ￿￿ b T￿d









It is interesting to analyze the determinants of the real marginal costs for the domestic tradable
good sector and for the export sector since they are the driving forces of the changes in the sector
in￿ ations. The real marginal cost in the domestic tradable good sector depends positively on the tax
shocks and wage changes. Tradable productivity shocks decrease the real marginal cost. Moreover we
observe also the e⁄ects of movements in the relative prices on the real marginal cost. Both a rise in
the ratio of nontradable to tradable prices and a rise in terms of trade (the ratio of foreign tradable
to home tradable prices) result in substitution e⁄ect towards home tradable prices making the real
marginal cost increase. The magnitude of this change depends inversely on respective shares of home
tradables in the aggregate and tradable consumption basket. As far as the export sector of home
tradables is concerned we also notice that changes in the real exchange rate a⁄ect the real marginal
cost. In particular when we observe a real exchange rate depreciation then through the expenditure
switching e⁄ect there is an increase in output of tradables leading to a decrease in the real marginal
cost.
Similarly we can derive the optimal prices for the both markets of the foreign traded good sector.
3.3 Monetary and ￿scal policies
There exist governments in both economies which occupy with collecting revenue taxes and ￿nance
government expenditures in the domestic traded and nontraded sector. We allow for lump sum
taxation which serves to balance the budget in each period:
n Z
0
￿t (PH;t(i)YH;t(i) + PN;t(i)YN;t(i))di =
n Z
0









t (PH;t(i￿)YH;t(i￿) + PN;t(i￿)YN;t(i￿))di￿ =
1￿n Z
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The existence of price stickiness and also other rigidities in the model such as deviations from PPP
provide a role for the monetary policy. The distortion caused by monopolistic competition is o⁄set
by setting the output subsidy in the steady state so that output in the ￿ exible price equilibrium is
e¢ cient.27
27We set the steady state ratio of taxes to be ￿ = ￿ 1
￿￿1:
16The monetary authority uses a short-term interest rate as the monetary instrument. The general
from of the interest rate feedback rule is the following one:












(1 +￿ {) (46)
where ￿y; ￿￿; ￿S are the feedback coe¢ cients to output gap (Y n
t is the natural level of output
obtained form equilibrium under ￿ exible prices), CPI in￿ ation around a target rate ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ is the steady
state value of CPI in￿ ation); nominal exchange rate around a target level of ￿ S (￿ S is the steady state
value of the nominal exchange rate), ￿ { - the steady state value of the nominal interest rate: We also
assume the interest rate smoothing:
(1 + it+1) = (1 +e it+1)1￿￿(1 + it)￿"
mp
t+1 (47)
where ￿ - the rate of interest rate smoothing, "
mp
t+1 - the monetary policy shock (exogenous).
The loglinearised version of equation (46) around the steady state is the following:
b Rt = ￿y(1 ￿ ￿)^ yt + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)b ￿t + ￿S(1 ￿ ￿)b St + ￿b Rt￿1 +b "
mp
t (48)
where b Rt = ln 1+it
1+i , ^ yt - output gap, i.e. ^ yt = ln Yt
Y n
t :
4 Macroeconomic volatility in the long run
As we already discussed, the catch up process of accession economies from the centrally planned
economy to the market one can be characterized by a rapid productivity growth, much higher than in
the euro area, and also by a strong rise in public investment re￿ ected in infrastructure improvements.
These two shocks both on the supply and demand side of the economy, together with external shocks
occurring in the euro area, a⁄ect the variability of accession economies. Researchers especially point at
the importance of productivity increases and their e⁄ect on accession economies. Indeed in papers of
Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) positive supply side shocks occurring especially
in traded good sector in the accession countries lead to the Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect. However
this e⁄ect can be achieved if we impose quite a restrictive set of assumptions: mobility of labour
and capital across sectors, mobility of capital internationally, constant returns to scale in the mobile
factors, exogenous world interest rate, perfect competition in the goods￿sector. Since we abandon
some of these assumptions, i.e. mobility of capital and also perfect competition in the tradable sector,
in our modelling framework we can expect that the Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect will not be strong.
We study ￿rst the long run characteristics of our model (the ￿ exible price economy)28 by
putting a special attention on the real exchange rate dynamics. We solve the model by taking ￿rst
28The ￿exible price environment allows for an analytical solution and subsequently ￿nding the determinants of ￿uc-
tuations for each variable. Importantly the ￿exible price equilibrium can be considered as a kind of the long run
equilibrium towards which the sticky price economy converges.
17order approximation around the deterministic steady state where the shocks take constant values.29
The solution of this log-linearised model will provide us with the representation of the variables as
functions of the domestic and foreign shocks.
In particular combining log-linearised around the steady state domestic and Euler equations and
international risk sharing condition ((22, 23), (25)) we obtain that the real exchange rate is a function
of the current and future real interest rate di⁄erentials between home and foreign economy:
d RSn















t - log-linearised deviations from the steady state of the domestic and foreign
real interest rate in the ￿ exible price model, c Cn
R
t = c Cn
t ￿ c Cn
￿
t - log-linearised deviations from the
steady state of the consumption di⁄erences between two countries.30 Subsequently the current and
future real interest rate di⁄erentials are summarized by the current consumption di⁄erential between
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t - the relative productivity shocks. Similarly we can represent the real exchange
rate as the function of the relative prices:
d RSn
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t : Subsequently the relative prices can be represented as functions of the
set of the domestic and foreign shocks:
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t - the rela-
tive government expenditure shocks and tax shocks.31
29For the purpose of the following derivation we asume that two countries are symmetric in their structural parameters
except for the size. Moreover we assume that the government expenditures equal zero in the steady state.
30The upperscript n stands for the ￿exible price economy variables.
31^ gR
N;t = ^ gN;t ￿ ^ g￿
N;t; ^ gR
T;t = ^ gH;t ￿ ^ g￿
F;t;
b ￿R
t = b ￿t ￿ b ￿￿
t; b A
T;R
t = b AH
t ￿ b AF￿
t ; b A
N;R
t = b AN
t ￿ b AN￿
t
18The equation (51) represents a useful platform to study the e⁄ects of the domestic tradable
productivity shocks on the real exchange rate. When the domestic tradable productivity shock occurs
we observe a rise in the ratio of domestic nontradable to tradable prices (domestic terms of trade).
This e⁄ect leads to a real exchange rate appreciation. Moreover the higher the share of nontradables
in the domestic economy this e⁄ect is stronger. However since home and foreign tradables in our
model are assumed to be imperfect substitutes we can also observe movements in terms of trade in
result of the domestic tradable productivity shock. As already studied by Benigno and Thoenisen
(2003) higher productivity in the home tradable sector can actually lead to a lower price of home
tradable goods in relation to foreign tradable goods which means worsening of terms of trade. The
magnitude of the terms of trade movements depends inversely on the degree of substitution between
home and foreign tradable goods. This e⁄ect leads to a real exchange rate depreciation. In addition
it is stronger the smaller the degree of openness.32
Summing up in presence of the home tradable productivity shocks there are two opposing
e⁄ects determining the real exchange rate adjustment. The ￿nal outcome depends on the degree
of substitutability between home and foreign goods, share of nontradables and degree of openness.
A recent empirical literature sheds some light on this uncertain e⁄ect of productivity shocks in the
domestic tradable sector. In particular Arratibel et al. (2002)33 report that in￿ ation in the accession
countries is negatively a⁄ected by labour productivity increases in the manufacturing sector34.
Notice that Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) base their analyses on the
assumption that home tradable prices are ￿xed internationally. This supposition is based on the
argument that accession countries cannot a⁄ect their terms of trade. Subsequently terms of trade
are treated exogenously and cannot act as transmitters or absorbers of the shocks. Prices of home
tradable goods are not a⁄ected by domestic supply shocks. That is why in their framework we observe
a real exchange rate appreciation and in￿ ation as a result of the domestic tradable productivity shock.
Additionally the role of demand side shocks in the real exchange rate dynamics is absent in
the papers of Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). The ￿ exible price equilibrium in
our model illustrates the role of demand shocks occurring through the terms of trade movements (look
at equations: (51), (52)). Interestingly (as analysed by Altissimo et al (2004)) there is no role for
demand shocks in driving the dynamics of the real exchange rate once the home and foreign tradables
are perfect substitutes, i.e. ￿ ! 1. In particular equation on the real exchange rate dynamics (51)
32Notice that for the ￿exible price economy (with a symmetric steady state) if we assume that there is no home bias,
i.e. ￿ = 1, then for for a su¢ ciently high elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods, i.e. ￿ > 1
the productivity increases in the domestic tradable sector will always lead to domestic in￿ation and real exchange rate
appreciation.
33Arratibel et al (2002) perform an panel study on determinants of dual in￿ation (in tradable and nontradable goods)
in the following transition countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The regression equation (with in￿ation as the dependent variable) is based on the
hybrid new Phillips curve equation with some other explanatory variables such as: exchange rate regime, productivity
growths, liberalisation index, oil prices, government de￿cit ratios, unemployment rates, GDP, euro area GDP growth
and terms of trade.
34In many empirical studies the sectoral productivity increases are proxied by labour productivity increases.
19becomes:
d RSn
t = ￿￿( b A
T;R
t ￿ b A
N;R
t ) (54)
The equation (54) represents the Balassa - Samuelson e⁄ect in its original form. Since terms
of trade do not move in result of the shocks real exchange rate and in￿ ation movements are associated
only with supply shocks. From the international risk sharing condition we obtain that consumption
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As already discussed in Froot and Rogo⁄ (1996) the demand shocks will a⁄ect only quantities
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where c Y n
R
N;t = c Y n
N;t ￿ c Y n
￿
N;t; c Y n
R
T;t = c Y n
H;t ￿ c Y n
￿
F;t; ^ gR
N;t = ^ gN;t ￿ ^ g￿
N;t; b ￿
R
t = b ￿t ￿ b ￿
￿
t and :35
Summing up the real exchange rate and in￿ ation movements can be a result of both demand
and supply side shocks. In our analysis we identify a set of the crucial structural parameters which
in￿ uence the way real exchange rate and in￿ ation respond to the shocks. These are: the degree of
substitutability between home and foreign tradables, share of nontradables in aggregate consumption
and degree of openness of the domestic economy.
5 Macroeconomic volatility in the short run
In the short run when prices are sticky the real exchange rate adjustment to the new steady state
depends on the chosen monetary rule, i.e. behaviour of the nominal interest rate. Similarly to the
￿ exible price environment the real exchange rate is a function of the current and future real interest
rate di⁄erentials between both countries (see (22, 23), (25)):











b Rt+i ￿ b ￿t+i+1
￿i
(58)
The main di⁄erence between this equation and the one in the ￿ exible price economy (49) consists
35Notice that tax shocks will also a⁄ect the real wage, i.e.: b !R
t = (1 ￿ ￿) b A
T;R
t + ￿ b A
N;R
t ￿ wb ￿R
t :
20in the fact that in the ￿ exible price economy the real interest rates are the functions of the shocks
while in the sticky price environment they are formed by the chosen monetary regime.
Notice that the current and future decisions on the real interest rates are re￿ ected in the current
consumption. In order to understand the e⁄ects of each of the monetary regimes on the stabilization
of the domestic variables it is useful to introduce a new variable: the consumption gap de￿ned as
the di⁄erence between the current consumption in the sticky price environment and the consumption
under the ￿ exible price environment. Observe that we can write the log - linearized (around the
e¢ cient steady state) Euler condition in terms of consumption gaps:








where: d Cgapt = b Ct ￿ c Cn
t; c Cn
t￿ natural rate of consumption, i.e. the equilibrium consumption
in the ￿ exible price economy, d RRn
t￿ the natural real interest rate, i.e. the equilibrium interest rate
in the ￿ exible price economy. Interestingly performing in￿nite recursions on (59) we obtain that
the current consumption gap di⁄erential is determined by current and future real interest rate gap
di⁄erentials the sticky and ￿ exible price environment:












Additionally by combining equations (58) and (59) current real exchange rate can be represented
as:
















The above relation gives us very useful insights concerning the nature of any monetary rule
studied as compared to the ￿ exible price economy outcome where the monetary rule cannot a⁄ect the
economy.
Precisely if the real interest rates were above the natural ones in the domestic economy then
this would have an additional appreciation e⁄ect on the current real exchange rate which can be
associated with de￿ ation or/and nominal appreciation of the currency. On the other hand if the real
interest rates were below the natural ones in the domestic economy this would lead to an additional
depreciation e⁄ect on the current real exchange rate which can be associated with in￿ ation or/and
nominal depreciation of the currency.
6 Monetary regimes comparison
In order to perform the simulation exercise aimed at comparison of the monetary regimes we
follow a standardized parametrization. Let us note that for this benchmark case we set the majority
21of parameters to be the same in both economies. In the section regarding the sensitivity analysis we
will discuss the impact of some of the structural parameters on the monetary regimes comparison.
Importantly we set the size of the small country, n, to 1%. The degree of openness of the small
country , ￿, is assumed to be 0.5 which implies that the imported consumption constitutes for around
50% of the tradable consumption.36 The steady state ratio of government expenditures to sector
output is assumed to be 10% following the supposition of Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). As we
already said earlier we set the steady state tax ratio to a value that o⁄sets the monopolistic distortions
in the ￿ exible price equilibrium.
The discount factor, ￿, equals 0.99 implying the annual interest rate of around 4 percent. Following
Stockman and Tesar (1995) we assume that inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ￿, is set
to 2. As in Laxton and Pesenti (2003) we assume that inverse of labour supply elasticity is equal to
2.5. The elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable consumption, ￿, is set to 0.5 as
in Stockman and Tesar (1995) and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables,
￿, is assumed to be 1.5 following Backus et al (1995). The elasticity of substitution for goods within a
sector, ￿, is assumed to be 7.88 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) which implies a 15% markup.
Probability of not changing the price,￿, for all the sectors in both economies is set to 0.85. This
parameter is taken from Smets and Wouters (2003) who calibrate their model to the euro area data
and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003)37 who choose this value for the CEE countries. Lastly the share of
nontradables in the aggregate consumption,￿, is assumed to be 0.5. This value is in line with Benigno
and Thoenisen (2003) for the euro area and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) for the CEE countries.
As far as the monetary policy is concerned the di⁄erent monetary regimes are distinguished by the
speci￿c values assigned to the feedback coe¢ cients in the monetary rule (see (48)). In particular:
￿ a ￿xed exchange rate regime (a strict peg to the currency of the big country) is described as the
monetary rule with ￿y = 0; ￿￿ = 0; ￿S ! 1,
￿ a ￿ exible exchange rate regime in which the monetary rule stabilises CPI in￿ ation is described
as the monetary rule with ￿y = 0; ￿￿ ! 1; ￿S = 0,
￿ a managed ￿ oat exchange rate regime in which the monetary rule stabilises CPI in￿ ation and
nominal exchange rate is described as the monetary rule with ￿y = 0; ￿￿ = 2; ￿S = 0:025.38
In addition the monetary rule is characterised by the interest rate smoothing, namely ￿ = 0:8: Let
us remark that the foreign economy follows the Taylor rule with the feedback coe¢ cients: ￿y = 0:2;
36The value of this parameter is chosen in a fairly arbitrary way but later in the sensitivity analysis we discuss the
implications of the changing value of this parameter on the performance of the monetary regimes. Still this value is
consistent with Natalucci and Ravenna (2003).
37They argue that the existence of a high share of regulated prices in the CEE and SEE countries justi￿es such a high
value of price stickiness.
38The speci￿c values of the feedback coe¢ cients are taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003).
22￿￿ = 2; ￿S = 0 which is in line with the empirical ￿ndings of Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro
area.39
We impose some simplifying assumptions on the nature of the shocks. All the shocks except for
monetary policy shocks follow an AR(1) process with the standard deviation of 1% and autocorrelation
coe¢ cient 0.9, they are not correlated with each other. Monetary policy shocks are white noise shocks
with the standard deviation of 1%.40
Based on the theoretical discussion in the previous sections we decide to analyze performance
of the monetary regimes in response to the foreign and domestic shocks by observing the evolution
of consumption gap which summarises the stabilization pattern of each of the regimes and also the
three variables constituting for the Maastricht convergence criteria, i.e.: nominal interest, aggregate
in￿ ation and nominal exchange rate.
6.1 Impulse responses to the domestic and foreign shocks
We study how the small domestic economy responds to the domestic and foreign shocks. First we
identify the common patterns of responses of the key domestic variables that are present under all the
regimes considered and also the ￿ exible price economy. Next we identify the sources of di⁄erences in
the response of each of the regimes by analyzing behaviour of the consumption gap (see 61).
6.1.1 Domestic supply shocks
First we examine the e⁄ects of domestic productivity shocks in both sectors (see Figure 1 in the
appendix). Both productivity shocks result in the real exchange rate depreciation under all the
regimes and the ￿ exible price economy. An imperfect substitution between all types of goods leads to
a decline in domestic prices and the real exchange depreciation. Moreover we observe a decline in the
natural real interest rate which is associated with the increase in the domestic aggregate consumption.
Subsequently the expenditure switching e⁄ect leads to an increase in the domestic aggregate output.
Importantly the magnitude of the real exchange rate depreciation di⁄ers for the two shocks ana-
lyzed. This can be easily understood by observing the changes in relative prices.(see 51). Productivity
shocks in the nontradable sector lead to a decline in the ratio of nontradable to tradable prices and
a rise in terms of trade. Both changes have a depreciation e⁄ect on the real exchange rate. On the
other hand productivity shocks in the tradable productivity sector result in a rise of both types of
relative prices with the opposing e⁄ects on the real exchange rate.
The di⁄erences in response of the economy under the alternative regimes are summarized by the
consumption gap (see equations (59), (61)). Since the productivity shocks entail de￿ ationary pressures
39Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate that ￿y = 0:14; ￿￿ = 1:65 with the interest rate smoothing parameter ￿ = 0:95.
40Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) assume that productivity shocks in the small country are perfectly correlated. More-
over their standard deviations are 2% for the tradable good productivity and 1,8% for the nontradable good productivity.
The autocorrelation is assumed to be 0.85. Moreover they estimate based on the Czech Republic data that the govern-
ment spending on nontradable goods follows an AR(1) process with the standard deviation of 2.42% and autocorrelation
of 0.7. The monetary policy shock is assumed to be a white noise with the standard deviation of 0.6%.
23the magnitude of a change in the nominal interest will depend on the importance which is attached
to in￿ ation changes in each of the alternative monetary rules and also to the ￿ uctuations in the
nominal exchange rate. Not surprisingly CPI targeting results in the strongest decline of the nominal
interest rate and a positive consumption gap. On the other hand the peg regime, not able to use
the nominal interest rate to stabilize the economy, is characterized by the strongest de￿ ation and a
negative consumption gap.
The stabilization under CPI targeting regime involves a high response of the nominal interest rate
and a nonstationary depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.41 On the other hand peg regime
guarantees stabilization of the nominal exchange rate but at the expense of de￿ ation and a fall in real
wage. The managed ￿ oat is characterized by the intermediate responses: we observe both de￿ ation
and some ￿ uctuations of the nominal exchange rate: depreciation followed by a small appreciation.42
Interestingly comparison of the consumption gaps among the regimes reveals that productivity
shocks occurring in the tradable sector require more stabilization of the nominal exchange rate. On
the other hand productivity shocks originating in the nontradable sector require more stabilization of
the aggregate in￿ ation. (see Table 1 in the Appendix) 43
Notice that these results are on the contrary to the ￿ndings of Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003) who report that CPI in￿ ation targeting leads to excessive recession. These opposite
results are due to the fact that in our setting the domestic supply shocks lead to the real exchange
rate depreciation and de￿ ationary pressures.
6.1.2 Domestic demand shocks
Now we analyze the response of the economy to the government expenditure shocks in both sectors
and also tax shock (see Figure 3 in the appendix). The government expenditure shocks lead to the
crowding out e⁄ect resulting in the domestic aggregate consumption decline. Natural rate of interest
increases which e⁄ects in the real exchange rate appreciation. An additional government demand in
one of the sectors increases the sector output and subsequently leads to a rise in real wages and higher
real marginal cost. Tax shocks directly increase the real marginal cost leading to a lower domestic
aggregate output and consumption. As a result under all the domestic demand shocks terms of trade
improve and the ratio of nontradable to tradable prices increases.
We identify the di⁄erences between the alternative regimes by examining the behavior of the
41Benigno and Benigno (2004) study in detail the nominal exchange rate determination under the interest rate rules.
They ￿nd that the nonstationary behaviour of the nominal exchange rate can be generated by the real shocks drawn
from the stationary distribution in the ￿exible exchange rate regimes.
42As discussed in Benigno and Benigno (2004) productivity shocks under the ￿exible exchange rate regimes lead to a
rise in terms of trade and the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate followed by the appreciation. The magnitude
of both e⁄ects depends on the aggresiveness of the monetary rule towards in￿ation. In the limiting case - under CPI
targeting we observe only a short run e⁄ect. Similarly under the managed exchange rate regimes we observe a de￿ation
followed by a small in￿ation. The magnitude of the e⁄ects depend on the aggressiveness of the regime towards the
exchange rate.
43This is due to the fact that natural rate of interest decreases much more under the domestic nontradable productivity
shock than under the domestic tradable productivity shock.
24consumption gap. Note that domestic demand shocks lead to in￿ ationary pressures and the real
exchange rate appreciation. The CPI targeting is characterized by the highest increase in the nominal
interest as this regime aims at stabilizing in￿ ation. This response results in a negative consumption
gap and a higher real exchange rate appreciation leading to a smaller expansion in the economy. On
the other hand the peg regime allowing for in￿ ation and also the highest rise in real wage reports
a positive consumption gap resulting in a smaller real exchange rate appreciation and a boom in
the economy. The managed ￿ oat regime features intermediate responses and is characterized by the
smallest consumption gap. (see Table 2 in the Appendix)
Notice that since in our setting the domestic demand shocks lead to the real exchange rate appre-
ciation and in￿ ation we face the same evaluation of the regimes as in Devereux (2003) and Natalucci
and Ravenna (2003) for the domestic tradable productivity shocks.
6.1.3 Foreign shocks
The general pattern of response of the domestic economy to the foreign shocks depends on the way
foreign aggregate consumption and also foreign real interest rate are a⁄ected. In particular foreign
supply shocks lead to an increase in the foreign consumption and decline in the foreign real interest
rate. Foreign demand shocks result in a decrease in the foreign consumption and an increase in the
foreign real interest rate.44 A change in the foreign consumption leads to a change of the same sign in
the domestic aggregate consumption. At the same time we also observe a change in the real exchange
rate (induced by a change in the foreign real interest rate) which a⁄ects adversely aggregate output
through the expenditure switching e⁄ect. 45 As a result the domestic natural rate of interest changes
to a lesser extent than the foreign one.
Importantly the peg regime totally accommodates all the foreign shocks by setting the same
nominal interest as the foreign one which leads to a high volatility in the domestic variables (see Figure
7 in the appendix). This means that we observe a signi￿cant de￿ ation and a positive consumption gap
in result of the foreign supply shocks and in￿ ation together with a negative consumption gap in result
of the foreign demand shocks. The ￿ exible exchange rate regimes choose a di⁄erent response in the
domestic nominal interest as both of them, to a di⁄erent extent, are concerned with the in￿ ationary
pressures which arise through the changes in in￿ ation of the import sector and real exchange rate
movements. That is why their responses are muted in comparison to the ￿ exible price economy and
lead to a negative consumption gap in result of the foreign supply shocks and a positive consumption
gap in the case of the foreign demand shocks.
Interestingly comparison of the consumption gaps reveals that a total stabilization of the nominal
exchange rate guarantees the smallest consumption gap for almost all the foreign shocks. However
44The mechanisms of the e⁄ects of the foreign shocks on the foreign variables are equivalent to the ones explained in
the previous subsections.
45The strength of the expenditure switching e⁄ect depends on the structural parameters, i.e. elasticity of demand
between home and foreign tradables and also the domestic monetary policy.
25the smallest consumption gap for the peg regime is achieved at the expense of the highest volatility
of in￿ ation and nominal interest rate (see Table 2 in the Appendix). Only in the case of the foreign
nontradable productivity shock ￿ exible exchange rate regimes attain a smaller consumption gap.46
Note that these results crucially depend on the monetary policy chosen by the big economy. In our
parameter setting we observe a negative foreign consumption gap for the supply shocks and a positive
one for the demand shocks. If the foreign economy was replicating the ￿ exible price allocation47
than changes in the domestic real interest rate induced by the peg regime would be too aggressive.
Finally choosing appropriately the parameters of the managed ￿ oat regime it is possible to achieve a
low consumption gap together with a moderate change in the nominal interest rate, in￿ ation and the
nominal exchange rate.
6.1.4 Monetary shocks
The nature of response to the foreign or domestic monetary shocks depends on the chosen monetary
regime (see Figure 6 and 12 in the appendix). As far as the domestic monetary shock is concerned
the domestic economy is only a⁄ected under the managed ￿ oat (it comes from the de￿nition of the
regimes). An unexpected rise in the nominal interest rate leads to the overall recession together with
a real exchange rate depreciation and de￿ ation.
In the case of the foreign monetary shocks the domestic economy is a⁄ected the most under the
peg regime. Since the peg regime follows the foreign monetary policy this shock leads to the recession
together with de￿ ation but no change in the real exchange rate. Other regimes reduce the nominal
interest rate only slightly in order to prevent de￿ ationary pressures coming from the import sector.
Importantly the real exchange rate appreciation observed under these regimes makes the domestic
economy worse o⁄leading to a recession but at a smaller scale than under the peg regime. The smallest
volatility of nominal interest rate is observed for the managed ￿ oat regime however it happens at the
expense of the high nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations and a considerable de￿ ation. (see Table 2 in
the Appendix)
6.1.5 An overall evaluation of the monetary regimes performance
The di⁄erences in the way the monetary regimes respond to the shocks lie in the importance they
attach to in￿ ation and nominal exchange rate changes. As far as the domestic shocks are concerned the
de￿ ationary pressures produce a positive consumption gap under the ￿ exible regimes and a negative
consumption gap under the peg regime. On the other hand in￿ ationary pressures result in a negative
consumption gap under the ￿ exible regimes and a positive one under the peg. In the case of foreign
46The change in terms of trade is much smaller for the foreign nontradable productivity shock which results in a
smaller domestic natural rate of interest. On the other hand the nominal interest rate change induced by the peg regime
does not di⁄er for the two foreign supply shocks. This is due to the fact that the big country is closed and therefore
responds in a similar manner to any sector speci￿c productivity shock (price stickiness is assumed to be equal in the
sectors).
47by setting a higher coe¢ cient to the changes in in￿ation.
26shocks the results are opposite. Note that under the domestic shocks we distinguish clear di⁄erences
between the di⁄erent ￿ exible regimes and the peg regime. Under the foreign shocks responses of the
￿ exible regimes do not di⁄er much between each other but altogether they are signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from the peg regime.
For all the shocks considered managed ￿ oat regime can attain the lowest consumption gap and at
the same time guarantee the moderate changes in the nominal interest rate, nominal exchange rate
and in￿ ation. However parameters summarizing its sensitivity to nominal exchange rate movements
and in￿ ation pressures depend on the underlying shocks. In particular in the case of domestic shocks a
low consumption gap is achieved by setting an aggressive response to the in￿ ation changes (except for
the tradable productivity shocks). Foreign shocks require a more aggressive response to the nominal
exchange rate movements (except for the nontradable productivity shocks).
Next we study whether our ￿ndings can be subject to the chosen set of the structural parameters
describing the small domestic economy.
7 Sensitivity analysis
The theoretical analysis of the real exchange rate determination in the long and short run enabled
us to identify the structural parameters that can a⁄ect the responses of the small domestic economy
to di⁄erent shocks. In the long run perspective we discussed that a share of nontradables, a degree
of openness and also a degree of substitution between home and foreign goods a⁄ect the magnitude
of a change in the real exchange rate. Additionally in the short run a degree of exchange rate pass
through in the domestic economy can alter the performance of the small domestic economy.
We study how changing values of the mentioned above structural parameters a⁄ect the standard
deviations and also impulse responses of the domestic variables. Moreover we examine whether these
changes a⁄ect the way regimes respond to the shocks. We assume from now on that the monetary
regimes are occupied only with the stabilization of domestic economy in response to the real side
disturbances and do not undertake surprise actions (the foreign and domestic monetary shocks are set
to be zero). Thanks to it we can investigate how a monetary regime can a⁄ect the volatility of the
domestic variables in presence of the changing structural parameters.
7.1 Share of nontradables
Share of nontradables gives us the insight on how open the economy is: a high share of nontradables
indicates a relatively closed economy and a small share of nontradables describes a more open econ-
omy.48 An increasing share of nontradables a⁄ects the magnitude of the movements in the ￿ exible
price equilibrium real exchange rate (see 51).
48One has to also take into account a degree of home bias in order to conclude on the openness of an economy.
27In the case of the domestic nontradable productivity shocks and domestic demand shocks the real
exchange rate changes are higher. Subsequently there is observed a much higher volatility of in￿ ation
and/or nominal exchange rate. This in turn leads to stronger changes in the nominal interest rate
for the CPI targeting regime and to a lesser extent under the managed ￿ oat regime. As the share of
nontradables increases the consumption gaps for all the regimes rise, the highest increase is reported
for the peg regime.
On the other hand real exchange rate movements originating from the domestic tradable produc-
tivity shocks get weaker with a higher share of nontradables. As a result volatility of both domestic
in￿ ation and nominal interest rate declines for all the regimes. Finally consumption gap decreases
substantially for the peg regime.
In the case of the foreign shocks a higher share of nontradables induces higher changes in the real
exchange rate which lead to an increasing di⁄erence between domestic and foreign natural real interest
rate.49 The peg regime is characterized by a higher volatility of domestic in￿ ation and also a higher
consumption gap. On the other hand volatility of the nominal interest rate declines under the CPI
targeting regime and also the managed regime.50 However we observe an increasing volatility of the
nominal exchange rate for these regimes.
7.2 Degree of openness
Degree of openness is described by the share of imports in the domestic tradable consumption. It also
explains the importance of terms of trade movements in the real exchange rate determination (see 51).
What is more the higher degree of openness the higher share of imports in the aggregate consumption
and a stronger interdepence between nominal exchange rate movements and the in￿ ationary pressures.
In particular an increasing degree of openness leads to smaller real exchange rate movements in
the long run. In the case of the domestic shocks this means that changes in the natural rate of interest
decrease with a higher degree of openness. So the in￿ ationary or de￿ ationary pressures induced by
a domestic shock are smaller. This implies that the managed exchange rate regimes can guarantee
at the same time a stabilization of in￿ ation and nominal exchange rate regime which yields a smaller
consumption gap (except for the domestic nontradable productivity shock). On the other hand the
CPI targeting regime is characterized by an increasing consumption gap due to the nominal exchange
rate ￿ uctuations.
As far as the foreign shocks are concerned a smaller real exchange rate movement in the ￿ exible
price equilibrium means that the domestic and foreign natural real interest rates do not di⁄er much
49This result can be understood by an analysis of the equation (51). In particular in the case of the foreign demand
shocks foreign ratio of nontradable to tradable prices and also terms of trade rise while the domestic ratio of nontradable
to tradable prices decreases. Subsequently a higher share of nontradables in the domestic economy leads to a higher real
exchange rate depreciation. Note that the foreign demand shocks lead to a decrease in the foreign aggregate consumption
and a rise in the foreign natural rate of interest. However with the increasing share of nontradables the perfect risk
sharing condition implies that the domestic economy will decrease to much lesser extent than the foreign one. Finally
the di⁄erence between the domestic and foreign natural rate of interest widens as the share of nontradables increases.
50This is due to a shrinking import sector and therefore smaller pressures on the aggregate in￿ation.
28(it follows from the perfect risk sharing condition (124)). That is why if the big closed economy
replicates the ￿ exible price economy allocation then the consumption gap for the peg regime will be
decreasing. However at the same time volatility of the nominal interest is going to rise for this regime.
On the other hand the CPI targeting regime and the managed ￿ oat regime responding to changes in
in￿ ation and letting for the ￿ uctuations in the nominal exchange rate will be characterized by higher
consumption gaps (except for the foreign nontradable productivity shocks).
7.3 Degree of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods
Degree of substitution between home and foreign tradables plays an important role in shaping the real
exchange rate dynamics through the changes in relative prices. The higher the degree of substitution
between home and foreign tradables the smaller the volatility of terms of trade. This in turn will
in￿ uence changes in the real exchange rate in the ￿ exible price equilibrium and therefore changes in
the natural rate of interest.
As far as the domestic nontradable productivity shocks and domestic demand shocks are concerned
a higher degree of substitution will lead to smaller changes in the real exchange rate. As a result we
observe a smaller volatility of in￿ ation and the nominal interest rate (except for the CPI targeting
regime where additional movements in the nominal exchange rate keep the nominal interest rate
volatility on the same level). Subsequently consumption gap for the peg regime and the managed
regime is going to decrease. On the other hand in the case of the domestic tradable productivity
shocks real exchange rate changes increase with a (considerably) higher degree of substitution between
home and foreign tradables. As the home and foreign tradables become better substitutes we actually
observe in￿ ationary pressures (but of a smaller magnitude than the benchmark de￿ ation). Volatility
of the nominal interest rate reduces for the managed regime. On the other hand the CPI targeting
regime experiences a higher volatility of the nominal interest which is strengthened by the nominal
exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Finally consumption gaps for the peg regime and the managed regime
increase considerably.
In the case of the foreign shocks we follow the same reasoning as in the previous sections. In partic-
ular for the foreign nontradable productivity shocks we observe smaller real exchange rate movements
in the ￿ exible price equilibrium. This implies that provided that the response of the big closed economy
aims to replicate the ￿ exible price equilibrium the consumption gap for the peg regime will decrease
with a higher degree of substitution. On the other hand the CPI targeting regime and the managed
regime will be characterized by a higher consumption gap as nominal interest rate induced by these
regimes is smaller than the one of the peg regime. In the case of the foreign tradable productivity
shocks and foreign demand shocks a higher degree of substitution induces higher real exchange rate
movements. So the consumption gaps for the peg regime and the managed regime will be higher.
Moreover volatility of the nominal interest will rise for the managed regime and the CPI targeting
regime.
297.4 Exchange rate pass through
Our benchmark model assumes that there is a delayed pass through re￿ ected in the local currency
pricing (LCP). This delayed pass through allows for the large real exchange movements to stabilize
the economy in response to the foreign shocks. Thanks to it the more ￿ exible regimes do better in
stabilizing the domestic variables such as consumption, output and in￿ ation than the ￿xed regime.
In our simulation exercise we compare the performance of the di⁄erent monetary regimes in our
benchmark scenario with the environment of the producer currency pricing (PCP) which assumes the
fast pass through (see Figures 1a, 3a, 7a in the appendix).
As far as the domestic shocks are concerned we observe that in the immediate pass through
environment CPI targeting involves a change in the nominal interest rate of the opposite sign than in
the benchmark case. This happens due to the fact that nominal exchange rate depreciation present
with de￿ ationary pressures (or nominal exchange rate appreciation present with in￿ ationary pressures)
leads to in￿ ation in the import sector.51 The more open economy is, i.e. the share of nontradables is
small and the degree of openness is high, the more important these in￿ ationary pressures in the import
sector are for the aggregate changes in in￿ ation. As a result consumption gaps are similar for all the
regimes. On the other hand volatility of the nominal exchange rate is smaller. When the domestic
economy is hit by the foreign shocks the immediate pass through also induces strong movements in
the nominal interest rate under the CPI targeting regime. As a result the consumption gap under
the peg regime and the CPI targeting regime get similar. On the other hand the managed ￿ oat is
characterized by smaller but more persistent movements in the nominal interest rate.
Summing up under PCP the ￿ exible regimes by preventing in￿ ationary or de￿ ationary pressures
originating from the nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations succeed in reducing the real exchange rate
movements. But on the other hand they destabilize the domestic variables such as consumption and
output to extent similar as under the peg regime. These results con￿rm the ￿ndings of Lane, Devereux
and Xu (2004) who identify that in presence of the fast pass - through a small open economy faces a
trade - o⁄ between stabilizing in￿ ation and output while responding to the foreign shocks.
7.5 The sensitivity analysis and the monetary regime evaluation
The sensitivity analysis that we perform on the structural parameters of a small open economy in-
dicates that the choice of the regime is dependent on the speci￿c structure of a small open economy
and also its stochastic environment. Here we summarize our ￿ndings having in mind that our point
of reference in the regimes evaluation is the ￿ exible price economy and the induced volatility of the
chosen domestic variables.
All the long - run parameters analyzed a⁄ect a degree of the real exchange rate movements in the
￿ exible price equilibrium. In the case of the domestic shocks these movements summarize in￿ ationary
or de￿ ationary pressures present in the domestic economy. On the other hand in the case of the
51Under PCP in￿ation in the import secotr is given by the following log - linearised equation: b ￿F;t = b ￿￿
F;t + d ￿St:
30foreign shocks these movements describe a di⁄erence between domestic natural rate of interest and
the foreign natural rate of interest. Subsequently the higher real exchange rate movements present in
the ￿ exible price economy lead to a decrease in the consumption gap of the ￿ exible regimes and an
increase in the consumption gap of the peg regime. The higher real exchange rate movements in the
￿ exible price economy are associated generally with the higher volatility of the nominal interest rate
and in￿ ation.52
Based on this discussion we can summarize that the managed regimes attain small consumption
gaps for the economies with a high degree of openness, a small share of nontradables (when hit by
all the types of the shocks analyzed except for the domestic tradable productivity shocks) and a high
degree of substitution between home and foreign tradables (when hit by the foreign and domestic
nontradable productivity shocks or the domestic demand shocks). Additionally in the short run we
￿nd that a speed with which nominal exchange rate movements feed into the import prices creates a
trade - o⁄between stabilization of the real exchange rate and the domestic variables (i.e. consumption
gap) for the ￿ exible regimes.
Let us brie￿ y relate these ￿ndings with the nature of the CEE and SEE countries. Researchers
indicate that still the share of nontradables in these countries is considerably lower than in other
developed economies, e.g. euro area.53 On the other the home bias is reported to be very strong in
the consumption goods.54 Interestingly an examination of the data presented in the appendix reveals
that the countries which decided to peg are characterized by the highest degree of openness. Finally
the pass through is reported to be rather high in the accession economies as it is re￿ ected in the high
share of euro in the import invoicing patterns. This could be an answer to why the predominant
number of the CEE and SEE countries follow the regimes which stabilize the nominal exchange rate.
8 Conclusions
This paper studies the choice of the monetary regime in the SEE and CEE countries. We identify some
common characteristics of these countries regarding both a structure of the economy and its stochastic
environment which can in￿ uence the choice of the monetary regime. Then we build a two - country
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model representing a small open economy - one of the SEE
and CEE countries and a big country - the euro area. This framework enables us to conduct policy
experiments consisting in analyzing the e⁄ects of di⁄erent monetary regimes on the way a small open
economy responds to the set of foreign and domestic shocks. The studied monetary regimes roughly
aim to re￿ ect the monetary choices already made in the CEE and SEE countries: the ￿xed regime,
52However in the case of the foreign shocks smaller real exchange rate movements lead to stronger nominal interest
rate movements under the peg regime.
53See the tables with detailed data on the share of nontradables in the accession countries and the EU-15 in the
Appendix.
54See the detailed data on the share of the foreign tradable consumption in the tradable consumption for the accession
countries and the EU-15 presented in the Appendix.
31the managed ￿ oat and the CPI targeting regime.
We perform the theoretical analysis of the macroeconomic volatility of a small open economy in
the long and short run. We attach great importance to the real exchange rate determination as
it summarizes the pattern of the stabilization of a small open economy in response to the shocks.
Moreover we build up a useful platform for the monetary regime comparison by contrasting the
monetary regime choices on the real interest rates with the natural rate of interest. The study of
consumption gaps (de￿ned as the di⁄erences in current consumption with consumption under ￿ exible
price economy) in response to the shocks gives us useful insights about the nature of each of the
monetary regimes studied. Additionally we identify structural parameters of a small open economy:
a share of nontraded sector, degree of openness, degree of substitution between home and foreign
tradable goods, degree of price stickiness and also degree of exchange rate pass through which a⁄ect
the way a small open economy responds to the shocks.
Our benchmark analysis reveals that the di⁄erences in the way the monetary regimes respond to
the shocks origin from the importance they attach to in￿ ation and nominal exchange rate changes. In
particular the de￿ ationary pressures produce a positive consumption gap under the ￿ exible regimes
and a negative consumption gap under the peg regime. The in￿ ationary pressures lead to the opposite
results. Importantly the managed ￿ oat regime can attain the lowest consumption gap and at the same
time guarantee the moderate changes in the nominal interest rate, nominal exchange rate and in￿ ation.
However parameters summarizing its sensitivity to nominal exchange rate movements and in￿ ation
pressures depend on the underlying shocks. Additionally the sensitivity analysis indicates that the
choice of the monetary regime may be dependent also on the speci￿c structure of a small open economy.
In particular a small share of nontradables, a high degree of openness and the high pass through may
be advocates for the managed regimes frequently observed in the CEE and SEE countries.
The above analysis on the performance of the monetary regimes is based on their comparison with
the outcomes of the e¢ cient ￿ exible price economy. The welfare analysis together with the welfare
ranking of the alternative monetary regimes is the obvious extension of our study. In particular it
would be interesting to check whether the optimal monetary policy (derived from the optimal objective
function) satis￿es the Maastricht convergence criteria which ful￿llment is the condition to enter the
European Monetary Union and therefore constitutes a challenge for the monetary policies in these
countries.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Steady state characterisation
We de￿ne a symmetric, deterministic steady state with zero in￿ ation rate. There are no productivity
shocks (AH = AN = A￿F = A￿N = 1): Other shocks: government expenditure shocks and tax shocks
are assumed to take constant values. In particular GH = GN = G, G￿
F = G￿
N = G￿; ￿ = ￿; ￿￿ = ￿￿.




Demands for tradable and nontradable goods (12):
￿ domestic goods
Y N = CN + GN (63)





T + GH (64)
Y H = CH + C
￿
H + GH (65)
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First order conditions of the domestic and foreign ￿rms (coming from (34), (40), (41)) are the
36following:
pN = PN =
￿






H = PH =
￿

































Additionally we normalize home and foreign prices such that PH = PF:
So we obtain that real exchange rate is equal to 1:
RS = 1 (86)
Moreover from the production function (27)we obtain that:
Y = Y H + Y N (87)
Y H = AHLH (88)
Y N = ANLN (89)
L = LH + LN (90)
Substituting into labour supply optimality conditions production, demand equations, consumption
identities and ￿rst order conditions of ￿rms we obtain the following two relations for the domestic






































37This system of two nonlinear equations determines total domestic and foreign consumption. In
our simulation exercises we follow a numerical procedure to solve this system of two equations with
two unknowns.
9.2 Log - linearisation around the steady state
We approximate the model around the above de￿ned steady state. We present the loglinearised
equations for the ￿ exible price economy and also for the sticky price economy.
9.2.1 The ￿ exible price economy
Supply Nontraded sector:
(1 ￿ ￿)b Td
t = ￿ b AN
t + b !t + wb ￿t (93)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)b T￿d
t = ￿ b A￿N
t + b !
￿






t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b Tt = ￿ b AH
t + b !t + wb ￿t (95)
￿￿ b T￿
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c RSt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)b T￿
t ￿ ￿￿ b T￿d
t = ￿ b AH
t + b !t + wb ￿t (97)
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t + b !
￿


















t ) = 0 (99)
￿￿c C￿






















t ) = 0 (100)
38Demand Nontraded consumption:
b YN;t = dCN(c Ct ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b Td
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d RRt = ￿(b Ct+1 ￿ b Ct) (108)
d RR
￿
t = ￿(b C￿
t+1 ￿ b C￿
t ) (109)
where d RRt = b Rt ￿ b ￿t+1; d RR
￿
t = b R￿
t ￿ b ￿
￿
t+1:
9.2.2 The sticky price economy
Supply Nontraded sector:
b ￿N;t = kN(￿ b AN
t + b !t + wb ￿t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b Td
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t + ￿￿ b T￿d
t ) + ￿Et￿￿
H;t+1 (114)
b ￿F;t = kF(￿ b A￿F
t + b !
￿
t + c RSt + w￿b ￿
￿
t ￿ ￿ b Tt + ￿b Td
t ) + ￿Et￿F;t+1 (115)
Labour supply:
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Demand Nontraded consumption:
b YN;t = dCN(c Ct ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b Td
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￿Et b Ct+1 = ￿b Ct + b Rt ￿ b ￿t+1 (125)
￿Et b C￿
t+1 = ￿b C￿
t + b R￿









￿N(1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿
￿
N;t + ￿￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿
￿
t + ￿￿
y(1 ￿ ￿￿)b Y ￿





b ￿t = ￿b ￿N;t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b ￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)b ￿F;t (129)
b ￿
￿
t = ￿￿b ￿
￿
N;t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿b ￿
￿




t ￿ b Td
t￿1 = ￿￿b ￿H;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿F;t + b ￿N;t (131)
b T￿d
t ￿ b T￿d
t￿1 = ￿￿￿b ￿
￿
H;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿
￿
F;t + b ￿
￿
N;t (132)
b Tt ￿ b Tt￿1 = b ￿F;t ￿ b ￿H;t (133)
41b T￿
t ￿ b T￿
t￿1 = b ￿
￿
F;t ￿ b ￿
￿
H;t (134)
￿ c RSt = ￿b St + (b ￿
￿
t ￿ b ￿t) (135)
￿b St = b St ￿ b St￿1 (136)
￿ c RSt = c RSt ￿ c RSt￿1 (137)
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42Figure A: GDP growth in the EU-15 and in the accesion countries (at 
























Figure B: CPI inflation in the EU-15 and the accession countries (annual 











































accession countries: peg to euro managed float float
Figure B1: CPI inflation in the EU-15 and the accession countries (annual 



















accession countries: peg to euro managed float float
  
Table 1: 
Share of the nontradable consumption in the 
total consumption (average for 2000-2005) 
Share of the foreign imported tradable 
consumption in the tradable consumption 
(average for 2000-2004) 
European Union  Accession countries  European Union  Accession countries 
Austria  54%  Bulgaria  29%  Austria  37%  Bulgaria  13% 
Belgium  49%  Croatia  37%  Belgium  69%  Croatia  14% 
Denmark  47%  Cyprus  55%  Denmark  44%  Cyprus  57% 
Finland  51%  Czech 
Republic  42%  Finland  22%  Czech 
Republic  36% 
France  52%  Estonia  39%  France  22%  Estonia  48% 
Germany  48%  Hungary  44%  Germany  22%  Hungary  30% 
Greece  47%  Latvia  37%  Greece  23%  Latvia  35% 
Ireland  57%  Lithuania  33%  Ireland  79%  Lithuania  23% 
Italy  49%  Malta  54%  Italy  17%  Malta  68% 
Netherlands  49%  Poland  37%  Netherlands  43%  Poland  13% 
Portugal  53%  Romania  23%  Portugal  30%  Romania  9% 
Spain  48%  Slovenia  49%  Spain  21%  Slovenia  36% 
Sweden  48%  Slovakia  41%  Sweden  32%  Slovakia  34% 
United Kingdom  59%    United Kingdom  27%    
average  51%     40%  average  35%     32% 
                       
 
Source (all the graphs and the table): Eurostat and the Croatian Statistical Office Cgap R S π Cgap R S π Cgap R S π
nontradable 
productivity
0.141 0.226 0.000 0.264 0.111 0.736 0.119 0.459 0.000 0.000 0.148
tradable 
productivity








0.034 0.031 0.000 0.019 0.013 0.080 0.014 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.017
tax 0.017 0.016 0.000 0.010 0.007 0.041 0.007 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.009
monetary 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.808 1.129 0.348 4.855 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
nontradable 
productivity
0.042 0.025 0.000 0.034 0.097 0.640 0.070 0.121 0.167 0.000 0.092
tradable 
productivity








0.023 0.005 0.000 0.017 0.014 0.083 0.008 0.011 0.026 0.000 0.012
tax 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.030 0.014 0.214 0.019 0.083 0.001 0.000 0.032
monetary 0.602 0.355 0.000 0.229 0.110 4.219 0.282 1.823 1.012 0.000 0.541
Table 2: Volatility of the consumption gap, nominal interest rate, nominal exchange rate and aggregate inflation induced by each type of the shocks 
(benchmark case) under different monetary regimes
volatility (in %) induced 
by 1% shock to: 
BENCHMARK CASE
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Figure 7a: Impulse responses to the foreign nontradable productivity shock: producer currency pricing